Abstract-It is notably challenging to design an efficient and secure signature scheme based on error-correcting codes. An approach to build such signature schemes is to derive it from an identification protocol through the Fiat-Shamir transform. All such protocols based on codes must be run several rounds, since each run of the protocol allows a cheating probability of either 2/3 or 1/2. The resulting signature size is proportional to the number of rounds, thus making the 1/2 cheating probability version more attractive. We present a signature scheme based on double circulant codes in the rank metric, derived from an identification protocol with cheating probability of 2/3. We reduced this probability to almost 1/2 to obtain the smallest signature among code-based signature schemes based on the Fiat-Shamir paradigm, around 22 KBytes for 128 bit security level. Furthermore, among all code-based signature schemes, our proposal has the lowest value of signature plus public key size, and the smallest secret and public key sizes. We provide a security proof in the Random Oracle Model, implementation performances, and a comparison with the parameters of similar signature schemes.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the early stage of post-quantum algorithm research, it is of paramount importance to provide the full range of quantum secure cryptographic primitives (signatures, key exchange, etc.) for all the main mathematical problems cryptography relies on. This way, it will be easier to switch from one scheme to the other in the case one of the problems turns out to be insecure in the quantum model. Given that it is the oldest quantum resistant family and, hence, the most thoroughly studied among all the contenders, code-based cryptography is a strong candidate in the NIST competition to standardize quantum resistant cryptographic algorithms.
This work focuses on code-based cryptography digital signature schemes. A popular approach to face the long standing grueling challenge of designing such schemes efficiently uses the Fiat-Shamir transform to turn a 3-pass zero-knowledge identification scheme with probability of cheating 2/3 into a signature scheme, as initially proposed by Stern [1] , in 1993, with the use of random linear codes. The main drawback of such scheme is the large signature size. Many researchers followed Stern approach, trying to improve either the signature or the key size of the scheme. First, in 1997, Veron [2] proposed a dual version of Stern scheme. Then in 2010, Cayrel, Veron and El Yousfi Alaoui (CVE) [3] were able to reduce the cheating probability of Stern scheme to 1/2, and thus reducing the number of rounds (and hence the signature size) the protocol had to be repeated. In 2011, Gaborit, Schrek and Zémor [4] presented the rank metric version of the Stern identification protocol, decreasing significantly key and signature sizes, due to the fact that rank metric decoding has quadratic exponential complexity, while Hamming metric decoding is linear exponential. The same year, Aguilar, Gaborit and Schrek [5] , used double circulant codes in the Hamming metric to reduce the key size of the Veron scheme, and presented a 5-pass version of it, with cheating probability close to 1/2. Furthermore, they introduced a compression technique to reduce the signature size. Recently, in [6] , a rank metric version of Veron and CVE has been presented, though lacking a security proof.
In this work, we present a rank metric version of the 5-pass Veron double circulant signature scheme of [5] , with a new variation that allows us to reach a cheating probability much closer to 1/2, achieving signature sizes comparable to other post-quantum signature schemes. In particular we obtain the smallest signature (sgn), secret and public key (pk) sizes compared to Stern-like schemes based on codes, while, compared to other approaches used to build code-based signature schemes, we also have the smallest |sgn| + |pk| value. We provide a security proof in the Random Oracle Model, pseudo-code, implementation performances, set of parameters for 96, 125, 193, and 252 bit of classical security, and a comparison with the parameters of the most important post-quantum signature schemes based on the Fiat-Shamir transform.
The paper is organized as follows. Sect. II provides the preliminaries. Sect. III presents our new identification protocol, while Sect. IV proves its security. Sect. V sets the parameters of our signature schemes. Sect. VI is devoted to comparison with similar signatures. Sect. VII describes implementation details and performances. Sect. VIII draws the conclusions.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A linear (n, k) q -code C is a vector subspace of (F q ) n of dimension k, where k and n are positive integers such that k < n, q is a prime power, and F q is the finite field with q elements. Elements of the vector space are called vectors or words, while elements of the code are called codewords. A matrix G ∈ F k×n q is called a generator matrix of C if its rows form a basis of C, i.e. C = {x · G :
. Our schemes will use a special type of linear codes, called double circulant codes, which are a special case of quasi-cyclic (or circulant) codes (see e.g. [7] ).
Definition 1 (Double Circulant Codes): Let n = 2k for an integer k. Consider a vector x = (x 1 , x 2 ) of (F q ) n as a pair of two blocks of length k. An [n, k] linear code C is Double Circulant (DC), or 2-Quasi Cyclic (2-QC), if, for any c = (c 1 , c 2 ) ∈ C, the vector obtained after applying a simultaneous circular shift to both blocks c 1 , c 2 is also a codeword. More formally, by considering each block c 1 , c 2 as a polynomial
A systematic double circulant [n, k] code is a double circulant code with a parity-check matrix of the form H = [I k |A], where I k is the identity matrix of size k, and A is a k × k circulant matrix. In this paper we work with codes in the rank metric. Given a fixed basis β = {β 1 , . . . , β m } of (F q ) m , a vector a ∈ (F q m ) n can be represented as a matrix with entries in F q , by expanding each component of a i with respect to β in a column (a 1,i , . . . , a m,i ) T . where a i = m j=1 a j,i β j , i = 1, . . . , n. We define the rank of a vector as the rank of its matrix representation, with respect to β.
We denote the previous matrix representation as φ β (a), and by φ −1 β the inverse map. In what follows, we will omit β as we consider it fixed.
To send a binary vector of a certain Hamming weight to any other vector of the same Hamming weight, it is sufficient to apply a random permutation to vector components. The map with the analogue property in the rank metric, i.e. sending a vector of a certain rank to any other vector of the same rank, can be defined as follows (see [4] ).
Definition 2: Let Q ∈ M m,m (F q ) be a q-ary matrix of size m × m, P ∈ M n,n (F q ) be a q-ary matrix of size n × n, and v ∈ (F q m ) n . We define the function
Both in the Hamming and in the rank metric, random codes over F q asymptotically achieve the Gilbert-Varshamov bound [8] . Furthermore, they have close to optimal correction capability [9] .
We now define the problems upon which the security of the schemes we present is based.
Definition 3 (RSD Distribution): Given the positive integers n, k, and r, the RSD(n, k, r) Distribution chooses
The previous problem can be defined correspondingly also in the Hamming metric, in which setting the problem has been proven to be NP-complete [10] . The RSD problem has recently been proven difficult with a probabilistic reduction to the Hamming scenario in [11] . For cryptography, it is also useful to use the Decisional version of the problem. Our scheme security depends on the difficulty of solving the same RSD problem defined with 2-Quasi Cyclic codes (2-QC-RSD), rather than random linear codes. The decisional version of this problem is a special case of the Decisional Rank s-Quasi Cyclic Syndrome Decoding Problem defined for example in [11] . There is no known reduction from the search version of this problem to its decisional version. However, the best known attacks on the decisional version of the problem remain the direct attacks on the search version of the problem.
III. VERON DOUBLE CIRCULANT IDENTIFICATION PROTOCOL IN THE RANK METRIC
The scheme we present in this section, to which we refer to as the Rank Veron Double Circulant (RVDC) identification protocol, mixes the ideas from [4] , where the Stern protocol is converted from Hamming to rank metric and the function Π P,Q (see Section II above) is introduced, and from [5] , where the cheating probability of the Veron protocol is improved from 2/3 to 1/2 using the double circulant technique in the Hamming metric. In [5] , the intermediate challenge is a random parallel left rotation. To better exploit the rank metric properties, and to make it more difficult to guess the challenge for an attacker, we instead consider a random linear combination of all possible parallel left rotations.
Definition 4: Let n = 2k and x = (x 1 , . . . , x k ) ∈ (F q m ) k , y = (y 1 , . . . , y n ) ∈ (F q m ) n . We denote with rot i (x) the left rotation of i positions of the vector x, and with drot i (y 1 , y 2 ) the parallel left rotation of i positions of the two halves y 1 , y 2 of the vector y. Given a = (α 1 , . . . , α k ) ∈ (F q ) k we also denote with Γ a (x) the linear combination of all possible k left rotations of k − i positions of x, and Γ a (y) the linear combination of all possible k parallel left rotations of i positions of
Recall that we will denote by λ the security level of the scheme. The key generation algorithm is listed in Fig. 1 . The RVDC identification protocol is listed in Fig. 2 .
wR(e) = r, sk = (x, e)
y ← x · G + e, pk = (y, G, r) Fig. 1 . RVDC key generation algorithm in the rank metric
Prover Verifier sk = (x, e), pk = (y, G, r) ← KGen pk
Fig. 2. RVDC identification protocol in the rank metric
It is possible to convert the 5-pass identification protocol to a signature scheme using a generalization of the Fiat-Shamir transform, as shown in [12] . We refer to such signature as Rank Veron Double Circulant (RVDC) Signature scheme. We also refer to the scheme resulting by applying the commitment compression technique used in [5] as compressed Rank Veron Double Circulant (cRVDC) scheme.
IV. ZERO-KNOWLEGDE PROPERTIES OF RVDC SIGNATURE

SCHEME
In this section we prove the security of RVDC scheme by showing how the completeness, soundness and zeroknowledge properties are achieved. In the proofs we follow [5] . 1) Completeness: Given (sk, pk) output from KGen function, it easy to see that for any possible sk = (x, e) the Verifier always accepts after interacting with the Prover P on common input pk. This is because the honest Prover who knows sk is be able to construct the three commitments c 1 , c 2 , c 3 . Furthermore, the Verifier is always able to identify the Prover because the verifications match with the given commitments.
In particular, the check on the value c 3 when b = 0 is valid because Γ a (x · G) = Γ a (x) · G. Thanks to this, we have that
Notice also that the components of the first challenge a cannot be all the same, otherwise w R (Γ a (e)) = 0 or 2, depending of a being equal to (0, . . . , 0), (ã, . . . ,ã) respectively, and the check when b = 1 would fail.
2) Soundness: We will show that if someone can be successfully identified by V with the protocol, then it is able to retrieve the secret in polynomial time with a certain probability. To do so, we introduce a specific problem which is easier to be solved than the syndrome decoding, 1 except when there is only one solution, in which case the two problems are the same. The way in which we assure the security is by choosing the parameters which allow to decrease the size of the solutions of the new problem to one with a probability exponentially close to 1 (in practice, parameters are chosen so the probability to have more than one solution is less 2 −λ ). Problem 2 (Differential Rank Decoding Problem): Consider H a random double circulant matrix, Y a random codeword in (F q ) n of rank weight r, and A = {a 1 , . . . , a ρ } ⊆ (F q ) k , with a j all distinct for j = 1, . . . , ρ, and a j = (α 1 , . . . , α k ), with α 1 , . . . , α k all distinct. Let H·Y T be a syndrome. The problem P(H, Y ρ, A, r) consists in finding ρ words z j and a constant C such that H · Γ aj (Y )
T − H · z T j = C, and w R (z j ) = r for all j < ρ.
The above mentioned problem is easier than the independent syndrome decoding problem, because of the addition of the unknown C. However, it still seems to be hard to be solved. Note that we can suppose that there exist a particular solution Z 1 , . . . , Z ρ , C to the problem P(H, Y ρ, A, r), such that C is equal to 0. In this case, we have to solve the usual rank syndrome decoding problem
We now give several lemmas without proofs (which can be found in the extended version of the paper) which permits to give a sketch of proof of Theorem 2 which proves the soundness of our protocol. Lemma 1 gives the probability to find a solution of Problem 2 Lemma 1: Consider ρ, A, r fixed. Let Z C = (Z 1 , . . . , Z ρ , C) be a random vector with Z j , 1 ≤ j ≤ ρ a random variable with uniform distribution over the words of rank weight r, and C a random variable with uniform distribution over (F q m ) n−k . Let S ρ be a random variable depending on H and Y , equal to the set of the solutions of the problem P(H, Y ρ, A, r), ρ, A, r as in Problem 2. We have Pr[Z C ∈ S ρ ] = P(H, Y ρ, A, r) with probability , then he is also able to find the secret key of the protocol from the public key with a probability of about .
Theorem 1: If a prover P is able to be authenticated by a a verifier V with a probability greater than q k +ρ 2q k , then P is able to retrieve the secret key of the protocol from the public key with a probability greater than 1 − [
in polynomial time or to find a collision on the underlying hash function in a polynomial time.
Theorem 2: If a prover P is able to be authenticated by a verifier V with a probability greater than
, then P is able to retrieve the secret key of the protocol from the public key, and hence to solve the QC-RSD problem, with a probability greater than 1 − [
in polynomial time or to find a collision on the underlying hash function in a polynomial time. Notice that, in practice, for the chosen parameters the cheating probability is very close to 1/2. Proof 1: P is able to build c 1,1 , . . . , c 1,N and c 2,1 , . . . , c 2,N such that it can be authenticated with a probability greater than
For the Pigeonhole principle, we can deduce the existence of an integer j such that P can be authenticated by the first protocol with a probability greater than q k +ρ 2q k . Theorem 1 allows to conclude the proof.
3) Zero-Knowledge: We need to prove that, beside the public parameters, no information can be deduced in polynomial time from an execution of the protocol. We need to construct a polynomial time simulator S of the protocol that, by interacting with the verifier V , provides a transcript which is indistinguishable from the one of the original protocol. The simulator S should perform the following steps. If b = 0:
n , and z ∈ (F q m ) n such that w R (z) = r; compute h 2 = H(Π P ,Q (v)), and h 3 = H(Π P ,Q (v) + z). Note that Π P ,Q (v), z are indistinguishable from Π P,Q (u · G), Π P,Q (Γ a (e)), since, if P, Q are random matrices, then the function Π P,Q can map a vector of a certain rank to any vector of the same rank. Furthermore, the function Γ a preserves the rank.
Remark: notice that Stern-like schemes as usually presented are only weak-testable zero knowledge (see [14, Sect. 3.2] ). They can be straightforwardly turned into a full ZK scheme following [15, Theorem 3 and 4] .
4) Post-quantum security of the Fiat-Shamir transform: It is well known that the Fiat-Shamir transform is secure in the random oracle model (ROM). However, when the adversary has a quantum access to the oracle, i.e. in the quantum random oracle model (QROM), the situation is somehow more complex, and recently many results have been published. Since most of the schemes we compare to do not take into account this scenario, we also omit it, and leave it to future research. An alternative quantum secure transform by Unruh could be used instead of the Fiat-Shamir one, yielding though a considerably less efficient signature. To the best of our knowledge, no quantum attack has been published to Veronlike constructions.
V. PARAMETERS CHOICE
In this section we define the eight scheme parameters (q, m, n, k, r, ρ, δ, h) to provide 96, 125, 193, 252 bit of classical security. The last three fall into category 1, 3, and 5 in the NIST post-quantum competition. We set q = 2.
−m . A is the cost of the algebraic attack of [16] 
. Also, to avoid specific Gröbner basis attacks, the condition n > r(k + 1) should hold. B is the cost of the best generic combinatorial attack to solve the RSD problem [17] . C and D are the corresponding costs of the two attacks run on a quantum computer. We choose m, n, k, r accordingly, with n = 2k. We set r slightly below the theoretical distance d provided by the Gilbert-Varshamov bound, in order to avoid possible small rank attacks similar to small weight codewords attacks. We choose m to be prime, so to have no subfields of F 2 m . We also fix the number of rounds δ = 81, 129, 193, 257, ρ = 10 to reach the desired impersonation probability. Recall that the impersonation probability of one single round for RVDC is p = q k +ρ 2q k with overwhelming probability. Table I summarizes our choices. We call RVDC-λ, respectively cRVDC-λ, the corresponding instance of RVDC and cRVDC with security level λ. In Table II , we report key and signature bit sizes for cRVDC (RVDC signatures are about 53% longer while keys are the same), other signature schemes based on codes, and some post-quantum signatures. In particular, besides all Stern-like schemes we are aware of, we report the results of Parallel-CFS [18] , which is designed following the so called hash-andsign approach, and the Category 1 candidates of the NIST post quantum competition [20] that rely on the Fiat-Shamir 
VII. PERFORMANCE
In Table III , we report the performance of our scheme on a MacBook Pro equipped with a 2.9 GHz Intel Core i7 and a Huawei P20 Pro equipped with a Kirin 970 supporting ARMv8 instructions. The implementation is using AVX2 or NEON instructions sets for the finite field arithmetic but not on any other part of the code. The hash functions used are either from the SHA2 or SHAKE256 family, depending on the length of the needed output. We also used AES-CTR-DRBG as a PRNG. Our implementation outperforms the optimized implementation of SPHINCS + -SHAKE256 from SPHINCS + NIST submission package. 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented two code-based signature schemes derived from a 5-pass identification protocol with cheating probability close to 1/2, using double circulant codes in the rank metric. The second scheme optimizes the signature size from the first one, at the cost of few hash computations. The resulting signature scheme has a signature size of approximately 11, 22, 54, and 93 KBytes for a corresponding security level of 96, 125, 193, and 254. When compared to one of the most popular post-quantum hash-based signature schemes, namely SPHINCS+, the key generation algorithm is between 350 and 500 times faster, the signing algorithm is approximately ten times faster, and the verification algorithm is twice as fast.
